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2  INTRODUCTION 
 
Rwanda and Burundi, two countries in the African Great Lakes region, share many similarities. The 
resemblances are in terms of culture, geographic location, ethnic demography and history. During the 
civil war in Burundi in 1993 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, both countries economic and social 
structure was devastated. In 1995 both countries were among the poorest in the world (World Bank, 
2018). Despite their similarities, Rwanda and Burundi followed different developmental paths since the 
periods of violence in the 1990’s. In the last two decades, Rwanda has experienced a higher 
developmental progress than Burundi.  
Many development theories have tried to answer questions why certain countries are able 
experience a positive developmental transformation. Because of the similarities of our cases, theories 
that attribute geographical differences, culture, climate and natural resources to development do not 
seem to give gratification. In this paper, I will evaluate Acemoglu and Robinson influential historical-
institutionalist explanation of development and compare this with Adrian Leftwich’s theory of the 
developmental state. Acemoglu and Robinson explain the difference in economic growth by the quality 
of its political and economic institutions. Countries with inclusive political institutions will shape 
inclusive economic institutions, which will provide economic growth. Leftwich focuses on politics and 
the role of the state. States need to have certain characteristics to succeed, which are embodied by the 
term: ‘the developmental state’. These two theories make an interesting comparison because on certain 
issues they disagree on how institutions should be manifested. Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize the 
role of democracy and pluralism, while Leftwich questions the influence of democracy and argues for a 
weak civil society. The goal of this paper is to relate to the theoretical discussion between the two 
theories and try to find empirical support for one or the other. The research question is: 
Which theory best explains the differences in the developmental pro gress between 
Rwanda and Burundi? 
The reason I want to answer this question is that the similarities between Rwanda and Burundi 
are numerous. I find it interesting that despite the similarities, both countries have taken 
significantly different paths in the last two decades. Besides this, there has been little research 
on answering the question why economic progress has been much higher in Rwanda. 
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2.1  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
My research will be theory testing, I will start with the evaluation of the relevant theories. I will do this 
by laying down the theoretical debate and the main differences of Acemoglu & Robinson and Leftwich; 
this will be used as a guide for my methods of analysis in chapter 4. The main sources of both theories 
will come from Acemoglu and Robinson’s book ‘Why Nations Fail’ and from Leftwich’s book ‘States 
of Development’. Chapter 4 will elaborate which observations and propositions I should. If the 
observations in chapter 5 align with my propositions, I will know which theory is supported. 
To measure the political and economic inclusion of Rwanda and Burundi I will evaluate the 
political system, electoral system, press freedom, freedom of assembly and association, access to 
employment and economic freedom. To test if Rwanda or Burundi have characteristics of a 
developmental state I will examine if a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, powerful 
effective bureaucracy, and a weak civil society are present.  
2.1.1 Case Selection 
Rwanda and Burundi are exceptional empirical cases in conducting a comparative case study. Rwanda 
and Burundi share their colonial history, culture, demographics and ethnic groups. From 1899 until the 
end of World War I they were under German rule as German East Africa. After World War I Rwanda 
and Burundi got passed on to Belgium as a mandated territory of the League of Nations. Both countries 
consist of 84% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa (Vandeginste , 2014, pp. 264-265). Since Rwanda and 
Burundi gained their independence from Belgium in 1962, power struggles took place between Hutu 
and Tutsi that led to numerous conflicts. In the 1990’s these conflicts reached their boiling point leading 
to more than 800.000 thousand deaths in Rwanda and 300.000 of deaths in Burundi. Due to the conflicts, 
the countries where among the poorest in the world in the mid-1990’s (Vandeginste, 2015, pp. 265-266). 
Besides the thousands of deaths, the social and economic structure of Rwanda and Burundi was 
destroyed. 
Based on income per capita in 1994, Rwanda was ranked 165th and Burundi 166th out of 171 
countries (World Bank, 2018). Since 1994, Rwanda’s GDP had an average growth of 7,4% each year. 
Making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. In 2000, the current president Paul Kagame 
took control of the country. Rwanda began to modernize its economy. Poverty rates dropped and health 
improved (World Bank, 2018c). Rwanda’s economy has experienced an economic boom and the 
population increased their living standards. In the same period, Burundi’s has shown very little 
developmental progress. GDP in Burundi has grown an average of only 1,2% per year (World Bank, 
2018b). This makes them special cases to perform a comparative case study to find answer why these 
differences exist. 
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1.1 Core concepts 
Before laying down the theoretical debate a few core concepts need to be clarified. The concepts 
inclusive and extractive political or economic institutions are of big importance in Acemoglu & 
Robinson’s theory in determining economic success. 
 Institutions are a set of formal or informal normative rules and conventions that structure social 
interactions. North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interactions"(1991, p. 97). Constraints are defined as formal rules or informal constrictions.  
They are either self-regulated or regulated from an external authority (Wiggins & Davis, 2006, pp. 1). 
Political institutions decide who is in power and how power is used. Economic institutions consist of 
norms, regulations and laws that form or modify human economic behavior and can be identified by: 
property rights, facilitating transactions and permitting economic cooperation and organization 
(Wiggins & Davis, 2006, p. 2). 
The main differences between inclusive and extractive institutions are the political system, the 
incentives structure and sustainable economic growth through technological improvement (Carter, 2014, 
pp. 6-7). Inclusive political systems will favor input of the people the rulers of the society govern. In an 
extractive political institution, the political system will undermine its people and exclude those that are 
not within the small circle of elites. These institutions will only have an incentive structure that would 
best serve the elite instead of the public.  
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Development theories try to answer the question how to achieve positive economic and social change. 
In this chapter the debate on development will clarified. In order to answer the research question I first 
need to identify the main theories on development and determine the relevancy in the case of Rwanda 
and Burundi. The focus in this paper will be on the debate between institutional and state-led 
development. My main sources for these theories will come from Acemoglu and Robinson’s book “Why 
Nations Fail” (2012) and The developmental state theory based on Adrian Leftwich’s book “States of 
Development” (2000). 
3.2 DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT 
We can characterize the different theories under a few main explanations that try to answer what factors 
drive economic growth: policy-hypotheses, geography-hypotheses, state-led hypotheses and the 
institutional-hypotheses (Lorenz, 2005, p.4; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 45 – 69). 
In the late 18th century  the geography-hypothesis gained recognition, the French philosopher 
Montesquieu linked geographic location to prosperity and poverty (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 49).  
The geography hypothesis assumes that geographical characteristics determine economic growth. The 
characteristics that determine if certain geographical areas experience economic success can be climate, 
diseases, strategic location or natural resources (Lorenz et al, 2005, pp. 4 - 8). Most of the poor countries 
lie between the tropic of Cancer and Capricorn, which gives appeal to the geography hypothesis. This 
made the geography hypothesis highly valued for many years (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 48). 
However, the geography hypotheses is not able to answer differences of economic prosperity within the 
same regions with the same climate, culture and recourses (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 48-56).  
The policy-hypothesis focuses on the role of policy decisions and leadership in explaining 
economic development. It differs from geography-hypothesis in that it offers concrete solutions to 
achieve economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, p. 67). Policy methods that promote a stable 
macroeconomic framework are seen as key factors for economic growth. Liberal trade regimes are 
central and international trade is valued (Frankel & Romer, 1999). In the 1980’s more support grew for 
neo-liberal economic policies models for economic development. These policies became known as the 
Washington Consensus (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 2). Countries that received foreign aid would have 
to rely on the market as a mechanism for distributing recourses and stimulating economic growth. These 
countries were expected to reduce government’s size and reach (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 2). For 
countries that were not able to deliver basic social services, maintenance and modernization of the civil 
service and the financing of the state, these structural adjustment policies were not successful. In these 
countries, the private sector was not able to provide services without the help of the state to coordinate 
and regulate (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 3). 
In contrast to the market-led policy-hypothesis, the role of the state in development became more 
popular in the 1990’s. This was mainly influenced by state-led development in East-Asian countries that 
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were termed Asian Tigers (Leftwich, 1995; Johnson, 1999; Wade, 2018). In a short period, countries 
like Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea were able to radically transform their societies and 
experience massive economic growth. The term “the developmental state” originated from the type of 
state that were able to radically transform their economies (Johnson, 1999, p. 33). This type of state also 
started to take form in other regions of the world, for example Botswana and Chile (Leftwich, 1994, p. 
159). An ideal-type developmental state is one that demonstrates a ‘determination and ability to 
stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the domestic private sector and arrange or supervise mutually 
acceptable deals with foreign interests’ (Leftwich, 2000, 167-8). A developmental state is broadly 
understood as one that displays a clear commitment to a national development agenda, that has solid 
capacity and reach, that seeks to provide growth as well as poverty reduction and the provision of public 
services. In the book ‘States of Development’ (2000) Leftwich gives a profound explanation to what the 
developmental state is and why it has been so successful.   
3.3 LEFTWICH 
Leftwich sees the presence of a particular type state “the developmental state” as the most important 
factor in acquiring a sustainable developmental growth (Leftwich, 1995, p. 401). The developmental 
state is a type of state that is greatly influenced by the success of Asian Tigers. The human and civil 
rights records of these states were not good. Nevertheless due to excessive economic growth  human 
and social indicators such as life expectancy, literacy and child health have increased significantly 
(Leftwich, 2000, p. 3). Both democratic and non-democratic were able to achieve success from a 
development point of view.  In the book ‘States of Development’ (2000), Leftwich tries to find 
answers to why these societies were able to perform so well. 
Leftwich focuses us on the primacy of politics in development (Leftwich, 2000, p. 4). 
Development is a political process and needs to be tackled with politics. Politics are the central and 
dominant variable in determining the success or failure of development. Leftwich defines politics as “all 
the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of 
resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in the 
private or public domains” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 5). Development must be understood as a political 
process involving new ways in which resources are mobilized, directed and deployed to promote growth 
and welfare. The resources can be land, capital or human beings  
Because of the primacy of politics, the role of the state is crucial. It is the only agency capable 
in undertaking the complex process to manage and coordinate the use, production and distribution of 
recourses on a national basis. That is, if it has the structure and capacity to do this. The type of state that 
is able to do this is described as the developmental state. Developmental states are “states whose politics 
have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the center to shape, pursue 
and encourage achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and 
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promoting the conditions of economic growth, by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of 
both.” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 155).  
Leftwich shows criticism to the Washington consensus and international organizations such as 
the World Bank and the United Nations, that focus on democratization and improvement of human rights. 
In order to receive support political conditions are attached by World Bank to persuade countries in 
developing democracies, and improve human rights this is called good governance (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 
120-121). Leftwich is skeptical whether such conditions have an impact on the political culture and 
political process. States that have not concentrated enough power, probity, autonomy and competence 
at the center to shape, pursue and encourage determined developmental objectives will fail in impacting 
political culture, for example corruption culture in politics (Leftwich, 2000, p. 126).   He argues that 
underdeveloped countries do not have the necessary conditions for democracies to emerge and even 
more special conditions to consolidate and remain stable (Leftwich, 2000, p. 10. If development occurs 
in these countries under backings of the developmental state, it will help to establish the conditions from 
which democracies emerge. He contends that the developmental state is a transitional form. States that 
were successful in their developmental transition will eventually improve the aspects it initially ignored, 
like democracy or human rights.  
Leftwich also questions the thinking that democracy is a necessary feature for development. 
Democratic politics are seldom the required politics of radical change (Leftwich, 200, p.150). The form 
of democracy is a critical factor in determining the pace and extent of developmental achievements. The 
developmental momentum is greater in a dominant party democracy than in a coalition democracy and 
even much greater than in democracies where political parties alter in power (Leftwich, 2000, p. 11).A 
determined  elite with relative autonomy will be more likely to guide fast and sustainable economic 
growth; these elites would not be hindered by the civil society. Democracies are less likely to deal with 
rapid changes (Leftwich, 2000, p. 189, p. 150). This is also observed with the Asian Tigers, during the 
period of rapid growth, most of the countries were authoritarian, in time most of them have developed 
democratic regimes.  
In his developmental state model, he defines the characteristics of countries that experienced 
rapid development. Developmental states have a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, 
powerful and competent bureaucracy and weak civil society. A determined developmental elite control 
developmental states. Their goal is not self-enrichment but have a determined commitment to economic 
growth and transformation (Leftwich, 2000, p160). The elites have relative autonomy over the state 
institutions they control. The state has the possibility to act independently without being pressured by 
different interest groups, regions or groups (Leftwich, 2000, p161). Furthermore, the characteristics 
include an ability to define and implement developmental objectives. Elites that have relative autonomy 
can focus on the national interest. 
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In developmental states, the elite can make use of a powerful competent bureaucracy able to manage 
economic and social development (Leftwich, 2000, p162). It gives the state the ability to supervise the 
developmental process and implement new policies effectively. 
Civil society has been weak in the developmental states. In addition, there appears to be a 
condition of the rise and strengthening of developmental states. It is a result of the relative autonomy of 
the state (Leftwich, 2000, 163-164). Developmental states score badly on human rights records. 
Attitudes against the opposition are often not considered tolerable (Leftwich, 2000, 165). Especially in 
non-democratic states developmental states. Organizations or individuals that seem to challenge the state 
and its developmental purposes are neutralized, penetrated or incorporated by the ruling party (Leftwich, 
2000, 165). Despite poor human rights records, there still exists a widespread support and legitimacy 
for the state. Developmental states have lost their constitutional or political legitimacy (Leftwich, 2000, 
166). Legitimacy is gained in the manner in which these states have been able to distribute the benefits 
of rapid growth in terms of school’s roads healthcare, public housing and other facilities (Leftwich, 2000, 
166). 
In order for market-based economies to function, a stable and functioning state was needed, as 
was seen with the Asian Tigers. This also led to the recognitions of the role of institutions in economics 
and politics. Douglass North argued that the quality of institutions was essential in determining 
economic growth. The institutional explanations view the quality of institutions as the main driver of 
economic growth. Countries with better institutions will invest more in physical and human capital 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, p 1369). North, et al. (2000) account the degree of political order to economic 
growth.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) explain the differences of development between different geographical 
locations by the institutions that took shape during the colonial era. They find a relation between the 
different strategies of colonialization and developmental success. Certain colonies became settler 
colonies like North America and Australia, while other colonies mainly in Africa and South America 
were used for recourse extraction. In the settler colonies, intuitions were shaped to build a successful 
society for settlers. In colonies that were used for their resources, extractive states were set up to rapidly 
transfer goods to the colonial powers (Acemoglu et al., 2001, pp. 1395). The extractive institutions were 
shaped to let a small elite group benefit from the extraction of recourses. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue 
that geographical factors influenced the strategy of colonialization. Regions that had high disease 
mortality were less likely to become a settler colony. A relation was found between the institutions that 
were shaped during the colonial era with the nature of regimes in these countries today (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001, p. 1395). In the book, ‘Why Nations Fail’ (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) explanation is given 
to what kind of institutions are desirable. 
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3.4 ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON 
In their book “Why Nations Fail”, Acemoglu and Robinson, name political and economic institution as 
the main reasons for success or failure of states. Institutions influence behavior and incentives of citizens, 
individual talents are able to achieve their potential through the right institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012, pp. 43). For example, people like Bill Gates, Steve Job or Larry Page were able to complement 
their talents by acquiring a unique set of skills through the United States schooling system. They were 
easily able to start companies because of the economic institutions in the United States. Political 
Institutions provided stability and continuity for them to successfully continue their businesses. Because 
the political power in the USA is distributed broadly, it was not necessary to fear a disastrous new 
economic direction by the government (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 43). Economic institutions 
are crucial in determining the prosperity of a country and politics and political institutions determine 
what economic institutions take shape in a country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 43). In order for 
the society as a whole to profit from economic growth, the economic institutions need to be inclusive 
and pluralistic. Institutions that are not inclusive will only enriching those in power. In order to have 
inclusive economic institutions, a country needs political inclusive institutions. There should be a certain 
degree of pluralism, in which power is constrained and evenly divided among society. In inclusive 
institutions, power is not narrowed down to an individual or a small elite group (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012, pp. 80). There is also a certain degree of centralization and monopoly of legitimate violence. 
Without centralization and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, law and order cannot be enforced 
and society will eventually descend into chaos (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 81). 
Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that extractive political institutions will try to maintain itself. 
When a new group overthrows the ruling elite. These newcomers will have incentives to preserve the 
current extractive political and economic institutions, because of the few constraints that exist on power 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82). When power is unconstrained and concentrated in a narrow elite 
group, the political institutions are absolutist. The economic institutions are then shaped by the elites to 
extract recourses from society. The ruling elite will use these recourses to defend their political power 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82). These factors make it difficult for countries to radically change 
their institutions. Economic institutions that create incentives for economic progress may redistribute 
income and power in a way that does not positively affect the ruling elite (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
pp. 84). Economic growth causes winners and losers, new industries arise and old industries fade away. 
This is called Creative destruction. It causes rivalry to increase and threatens the elites, as they may be 
replaced (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 150). The ruling elite will try to prevent this from happening 
by limiting economic progress and innovation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 344). Therefore, 
countries that have extractive institutions are likely to stay in a vicious circle with an elite only interested 
in preserving power. It is possible for countries to replace extractive institutions for inclusive ones. 
When a convergence of different factors takes place in which a broad coalition of those that desire 
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reforms exists (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 427). An example for this is the industrial revolution 
in England, which set in motion path breaking technological changes like steam power and 
transportation. This led to increases in income and the foundation of modern industrial society. The 
emergence of a middle class challenged the political monopoly (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 85). 
It is also possible to argue in reverse that inclusive institutions are hard to change. Inclusive 
institutions have created several control mechanisms against the abuse of power. First, incentives are 
created for a pluralistic society that make the illegal seizure of power by a dictator, party within 
government or president, more difficult (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 333). Second, inclusive 
political institutions support and are supported by inclusive economic institutions. In inclusive economic 
institutions monopolies are reduced and dynamic economy is created which reduces the benefits for a 
seizure of power. Finally, Inclusive institutions will allow a free media to establish. A free media will 
provide information about threats against inclusive institutions, which mobilizes opposition (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012, p. 333).  Inclusive economic institutions will make it impossible for extractive 
political institutions to take shape. Since either, the inclusive economic institution will be transformed 
to benefit the elite or it will destabilize the extractive political institution and replace it for an inclusive 
one (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 82-83).  
3.5 COMPARISON 
 
Adrian Leftwich’s theory and Acemoglu & Robinson theory, both try to answer the question why certain 
countries are able to make a positive developmental transformation while others cannot. On certain 
issues, there exists some disagreement between Acemoglu & Robinson and Leftwich. The main 
differences are the importance of institutions and degree of pluralism in politics.  
Both theories see the importance of institutions. The historic context in which institutions take 
shape is crucial with Acemoglu & Robinson, but Leftwich believes that we should not overestimate the 
role of institutions in development.  Institutions cannot be seen as separate from the raw processes and 
practices of politics, which create and shape them. Leftwich sees the proof that institutions should not 
be overestimated in the many post-colonial states that overthrew, abandoned or transformed institutional 
arrangements that were passed on from colonial regimes, within a few years of independence, (Leftwich, 
2000, pp. 8-9). Leftwich believes that no institutional development can be promoted or sustained 
independent from politics, because no institutions are stronger than the politics that sustain it.  
Another difference is the role of democracy and pluralism in both theories. Acemoglu & 
Robinson emphasize the role of pluralist society in which power is divided in broad coalition. In these 
societies there is freedom of assembly, so citizens can come together to voice their concerns. Leftwich 
is in favor of determined elite with relative autonomy that can lead the country through periods of rapid 
13 
changes. The civil society should be weak, so elites do not have to take in to account the wishes of the 
population when pursuing development. 
According to Acemoglu and Robinson democratic societies encourage inclusive economic 
institutions to emerge, which are essential for economic growth. Leftwich believes democracy is not 
necessary for economic growth, but can follow from economic growth. Economic growth can create the 
necessary conditions for democracies to emerge.  
When taking in to account Acemoglu & Robinson’s theory on development and the 
developmental progress of Rwanda and Burundi, the following hypothesis will be derived: 
Hypothesis 1: Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi. 
When taking in to account Leftwich’s developmental state theory, the following hypothesis will be 
derived: 
Hypothesis 2: Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate how I will measure the variables of hypothesis 1 and 2.  
4 METHODOLOGY 
To test the hypotheses a qualitative analysis of documents and reports will be done. In this section, I 
will explain the chosen measures and how they will be evaluated. To construct the core variables from 
hypothesis 1 and 2 : political institutions, economic institutions and the characteristics of developmental 
state (determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, bureaucratic power, weak civil society, 
repression and legitimacy) I will derive indicators.  For political institutions the degree of plurality is 
important I will use the following indicators: political system, electoral system, press freedom. My 
indicator for economic institutions will be economic freedom, which consists of property rights, and 
division of wealth.  
To evaluate the political system, I will first compare regime types. Democratic regimes will be 
considered inclusive, authoritarian regimes will be considered extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p. 446). Second, the degree of representation of different groups. An inclusive political system should 
entail a system with a broad proportional representation of different groups in the government 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.419). I will specifically compare the representation of different ethnic 
groups, as it has been relevant in the history of Rwanda and Burundi. When a country has extractive 
institutions, citizens are not able to participate in the countries politics and economy. The large problem 
of extractive institutions is that elites want to keep their positions in power and wealth; extractive 
institutions are meant to keep these advantages over the rest of the population, so change is less likely 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 408-410). In inclusive political institutions, citizens have a say in 
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politics, which can be expressed in the electoral system . To test if the electoral system is inclusive, the 
elections of the countries will be evaluated by determining the fairness, the presence of an opposition 
and the changing of guard. Press freedom will be used as an indicator to measure incisiveness of the 
political institutions. An independent media emerges from pluralism; groups that have an interest in the 
continuation of inclusive institutions can become aware and organize against threats to these institutions 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 309). An independent media is an important control mechanism that 
prevents abuse of power. If rulers want to impose extractive policies, the media will report on this and 
an opposition can be mobilized (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 333). I will evaluate the rights to 
assembly and association. Pluralism is encouraged when there is freedom of assembly and association 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 455 - 457). The population should be able to come together, express 
their views and concerns over government policy when inclusive institutions are present. 
Economic institutions can be identified by three set: property rights, facilitating transactions and 
permitting economic cooperation and organization (Wiggins & Davis, 2006, p. 2). Inclusive economic 
institutions give the population the chance to participate and benefit from economic growth and promote 
innovation. There should be a certain degree of economic freedom. Economic freedom will be measured 
by the ease of doing business, and the quality of property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp.  337-
340).  
Developmental states are led by a small determined elite their goal developmental progress. To test this  
I will evaluate the economic policies and corruption will be evaluated as a measure. Their goal is not 
self-enrichment so corruption should be low. Civil society is weak in developmental states, society does 
not have influence on politics. Developmental states are also not concerned with human rights; this will 
be measured by inspecting freedom of civil society organizations and the compliance of human rights. 
The elite has relative autonomy in a developmental state it is able to operate freely without the concern 
of different interests. To test this power relations will be investigated. The bureaucracy is powerful, 
effective in the developmental state. It is capable of managing the economic development; this will be 
determined by evaluating the government’s effectiveness. Government effectiveness aims to measure in 
relative terms the ability of state bureaucracies and institutions to create and enforce government policies. 
In the next section I will compare Rwanda and Burundi based on these indicators for the 
inclusiveness of institutions and the characteristics of the developmental state. 
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5 ANALYSIS 
5.1 INSTITUTIONS 
5.1.1 Political Systems 
Burundi's political system is a Presidential, multiparty system. The president is both head of state and 
head of government. The parliament consists of a senate and a national assembly where members are 
elected for a term of five years by proportional representation. And a senate elected term of five years 
by communal colleges. Rwanda is also a presidential republic with a multi-party system. President Paul 
Kagame is head of state and head of government. Parliament consists of senate and chamber of deputies. 
The chamber of deputies has 80 chosen representatives and there are 26 senate members. In the 
parliament certain spots are reserved for certain groups, for example in the chamber of deputies, 26 
chairs are reserved for women, 53 are directly chosen, 2 seats come from youth councils and 1 seat 
representing people with disabilities. Although both countries appear to be democratic, In the 
Economist’s democracy index of 2017 both Rwanda and Burundi were considered authoritarian. 
Burundi is ranked 153th out of 167 countries, Rwanda scores slightly better and is ranked 133th.  
 
Both countries score high in representation of women in parliament. Rwanda scores extremely well and 
has the highest proportion with 61% women in parliament. Burundi also scores well with 36% women 
in parliament, it is ranked 25th in the world (World Bank, 2018e). The Burundi parliament has quotas on 
ethnicity and gender. Political parties must present candidate lists with a minimum degree of ethnic and 
gender balance. The top four candidates require at least one woman and of the top three candidates, only 
two can be of the same ethnicity (Vandeginste, 2014, p. 268). The national assembly require a 60% Hutu 
and 40 % Tutsi composition. The Senate consist of 18 Hutu and 18 Tutsi. For the Twa minority, three 
seats are guaranteed in both the National Assembly and the senate (Vandeginste, 2014, p. 268). Rwanda 
implemented a very different policy on ethnicity it has tried to abolish ethnic division with policies based 
on ethnic amnesia. The level of representation of ethnic identities is unclear in Rwanda, parties based 
on ethnicity or religion are banned. Addressing the question of ethnic representation is considered taboo 
and might be considered as a criminal offence (Vandeginste, 2018, p. 269).  A WikiLeaks cable from 
the US embassy in 2008 showed that in the Rwanda government, Tutsis hold a greater percentage of 
senior positions. Hutus in senior positions frequently held position with little power (US Embassy, 2018).  
In Burundi, the government heavily influences the judicial organs, by the use of political 
pressure. The minister of justice together with the president make judicial appointments, The Rwandan 
judiciary is influenced the executive power. The government has been alleged for pressuring lawyers to 
accomplish its goals (Freedom House, 2018a). 
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5.1.2 Electoral System 
Since 2005 Burundi has an average voters-turnout of 79%. The first elections after the war were 
considered to be fair, but since 2010 the fairness of the elections have been questioned. The ruling party 
CNDD-FDD have abused the states recourses and facilities during elections, CNDD received greatly 
more coverage in the media. Opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2010 because of the 
unfair playing field during elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). The current president Pierre 
Nkurunziza is democratically chosen by members of parliament and has been in office since 2005.  
Currently Nkurunziza is on his third term of office, while according to the constitution only two terms 
are possible. In the last presidential elections of 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza won with a 
percentage of 69% according to the IFES election guide (2018). These elections were controversial 
because it is claimed that Nkurunziza unlawfully participated in the elections (Rufyikiri, 2017, pp. 238). 
The highest court in Burundi accepted this third term. It was claimed that the government threatened the 
court (“Burundi court backs President,” 2015). Following the decision of the national court, violent 
protests occurred in the capital and plunged the country in an international crisis. Because of the protests 
the opposition boycotted the election. The names of the eight opposition candidates that initially wanted 
to participate were still placed on the ballot. This was done to keep the appearance of open elections 
(Vandeginste, 2015, p. 625). In May 2018, a referendum was passed changing the constitution, in order 
for Nkurunziza to remain president until 2034 (Vandeginste, 2017, pp. 7). But in June of 2018 
Nkurunziza vowed to step down in 2020, critics have contested this promise (Nimubona, 2018).  
Rwanda’s president Kagame is currently also in his third term as president, he is in office since 
2000. According to IFES Election (2018) guide Rwanda has an average voter’s turnout of 96% since 
2003. In the last presidential elections of 2017, Kagame won with a large percentage of 98,79%. These 
high percentages are largely explainable due to the lack of a strong opposition and a tight control of 
voters by local government bodies (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Only two other candidates participated 
in the elections. The National Electoral Commission of Rwanda disqualified other candidates due to 
technical reasons, which was condemned by the United States and the European Union (Amnesty 
International, 2018). Amnesty international (2018) has criticized Rwanda by claiming that political 
opponents are suppressed before and after the elections. Unsolved cases of disappearances of political 
opponents were observed. There was no freedom of association, no freedom of expression and unsolved 
killings of critics took place. The Human Right Watch (2017) claims intimidation and irregularities 
happened in the days before and during the voting of the 2017’s presidential elections. The US state 
department (2017) similarly observed irregularities during the elections and condemn the media for not 
reporting on the harassments of opposition candidates and the lack of transparency in determining why 
certain political candidates were not eligible. The 2010 presidential elections faced similar difficulties 
as in 2017 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Intimidations and non-transparent technical issues caused a 
lack of opposition. Kagame won these elections for his second term with 93% of the vote.  In 2015, a 
referendum was passed that gave Kagame the opportunity to be elected until 2034. The Rwandan 
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constitution permits political parties to exist, but these parties face serious restrictions. The government 
uses the protection of the national unity as an argument to limit political pluralism. The recognized 
parties are closely tied to the dominant RPF. In the 2010 elections, leaders of opposition parties were 
arrested (Freedom House 2018a). In the Democracy index, both countries score very low on electoral 
process and pluralism, Burundi 0,00 and Rwanda 0.83 (highest score is 10) (The Economist, 2018). 
5.1.3 Press Freedom 
Burundi is ranked 159th in the world press freedom index (RSF, 2018). The harassment of the media 
has intensified in the last months because of the recent referendum. Organizations like the BBC and the 
Voice of Africa have been banned. The media suffers from government censorship. In 2013 a law was 
implemented forbidding media to report on issues that can damage national security, which has led to 
many concerns (RSF, 2018). Since the 2015 elections more restrictions have been placed on the media 
and freedom of expression. Many criticisms are directly countered by claiming that the criticism is a 
threat to the national security (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Public expression is legally restricted. There 
exist many cases of intimidations, arrests and killings of journalists. After a failed coup in May 2015, 
many independent journalists went in exile and civil society groups were banned. 
 Rwanda is ranked 156th in the world press freedom index by RSF (2018a). It is considered not 
free. According to its constitution there is freedom of press if it does not deny the national unity. In 
practice every criticism on the president and government officials is in violation of national unity. Many 
journalists have been arrested, intimidated and have fled the country.  Both countries are considered 
unfree in the media freedom index by The Economist. They both score a 1 out of 10 and are both ranked 
145th. 
 
5.1.4 Freedom of Assembly and Association 
The constitution of Burundi grants freedom of association and assembly, yet there exist certain 
regulations that place limitations. Government representatives need to be part of public assemblies, 
assemblies can be shut down to protect public order, group sports in public is banned in the capital and 
demonstrations can at most take up to one day. In the 2015 demonstrations, demonstrators were killed, 
injured and arrested without trial. Association rights have been limited. It has been difficult to register 
civil society groups, critical groups are banned (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). In 2013 a law was imposed 
that restricted public gatherings (Freedom House, 2018).  
Association and assembly groups are tolerated in Rwanda if they do not separate from the state’s 
national unity. In reality collective bargaining and strikes are rare because of arbitrary rules (Freedom 
House, 2018a). Demonstrations are only allowed if they are no risk for public safety. Independent 
organizations have been intimidated and threatened when showing criticism towards the government. 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).  
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5.1.5 Economic Freedom 
In the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index of 2018 Burundi scores 50.9 out of 100 points, 
making it the 157th freest economy. Rwanda scores significantly better with 69.1 out of 100 points the 
39th freest country higher that the world average 61,1. In the World Bank’s (2018a) rating of economies 
ease of doing business, Rwanda is ranked 41th of 190 in the world and second of 47 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa over 2017. In the same ranking Burundi is placed 164th in the world and 34th in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank, 2017). In the same ranking Rwanda scores higher on property rights, it scores 69 
out of 100 while Burundi scores 17 out of 100. 
5.1.6 Conclusion 
Hypothesis 1 stated that Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi. I 
have tried to answer test this by evaluating the political system, electoral system, press freedom, freedom 
of assembly and association and economic freedom. The political systems of both countries did not 
differ a lot in regime type or the separation of powers. Rwanda and Burundi’s regimes have the 
appearance of democracy but in reality seem to be authoritarian. The differences in representation of 
ethnicity seem to be more distinct. Burundi has policies actively pursuing an ethnic proportionate 
representation. These policies have been successful and considered the most successful use of power 
sharing in Africa (Lemarchand, 2006). In Rwanda it seems that Tutsis are favored in the appointment of 
important positions. I consider neither political systems to be inclusive. Based on representation of 
ethnic groups, Burundi is slightly more inclusive than Rwanda. Separation of powers is limited both 
countries, the judiciary is pressured by the government. In both countries do not seem to have an 
inclusive electoral system. The leaders of both countries have been powerful and in office for a long 
time, this does not seem to be changing in the short term. There is one dominant party and opposition is 
thwarted and suppressed. Press freedom is also not inclusive,  the Rwanda and Burundi governments 
are actively repressing journalists lacking media freedom. Economic freedom seems more inclusive in 
Rwanda. Freedom of association and assembly is not inclusive in Rwanda and Burundi, there exist many 
restrictions. 
Rwanda only has more inclusive economic institutions, for the rest of the indicators the 
institutions are not significantly more inclusive than in Burundi,  hypothesis 1 can be rejected. Therefore, 
Acemoglu & Robinson theory that inclusive institutions provide for economic growth, is not supported 
in our cases. 
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5.2 DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
5.2.1 Determined developmental elite  
Rwanda’s President Kagame launched a program called vision 2020 in the year 2000, to transform 
Rwanda in a knowledge based middle income country by the year 2020.  These goals align with the 
success achieved in the last decades in reducing poverty, a high economic growth and reduced inequality 
(World Bank, 2018c). The government is actively working on developing the economy by improving 
the business climate (USAID, 2018). Which is reflected in high scores in the annual World Bank Doing 
Business Report (see section 5.1.5). In Rwanda, the fight against corruption is mainly done by strict 
enforcement. Rwanda is ranked 48th in the world in Transparency International corruption perception 
index of 2017. Burundi is ranked 157th out of 180 countries. Rwanda is the 3th least corrupt government 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (Transparency International, 2018a). There exist a special commission that has 
the goal to fight clientelism and nepotism: The Public Sector Commission. Which uses naming and 
shaming with a corruption convict database (Office of Ombudsman, 2018). 
Burundi has its own developmental program called Vision Burundi 2025, with policies and 
strategies to accomplish sustainable development. The goals set by the government are not embodied 
by Burundi’s economic performance, as it has faced years of recession (AFDB, 2018). Burundi’s 
corruption is perceived as high it is ranked 157th out of 175 countries according to the corruption index. 
According to Transparency international (2018) Burundi is the most corrupt country in East-Africa. 16 
to 30 percent of respondents have admitted to have paid bribes. 
5.2.2 Weak civil society 
Civil society organizations in Rwanda cannot operate freely. They are forced to work together with the 
government and concede with developmental and political goals (Greedy, 2010, p641). Human rights 
organizations have pointed to the concern of the politicization of human rights work in Rwanda(ICNL, 
2018). There is concern that those working in human rights are topic to intensified scrutiny. Civil society 
organizations in Rwanda face barriers of entry, activity and barriers to free speech. They have excessive 
documentation requirements to obtain legal status (ICNL, 2018).  Ministry approval is mandatory; they 
must integrate governmental priorities into their operations. All decisions involving their statutes must 
be approved by the ministry (ICNL, 2018). Only civil society organizations that do not focus on 
democracy and human rights are able to operate freely. There have been accusations that the government 
uses infiltration tactics similar to the ones used against political opposition (Freedom House, 2017). 
Interest groups that show criticism on the government are restricted.         
Burundi’s civil society has been shut down since the 2015 elections. Right after the elections 
during the protest, the government shut down local civil society organizations. Many civil society 
leaders have been forced to flee the country and the government have shut down all local independent 
radio stations (Freedom House, 2017). There have been costly requirements that prevent NGO’s from 
receiving official recognition. 
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5.2.3 Relative Autonomy 
. In 2006 Lemarchand compared the power sharing between Rwanda and Burundi in which he concluded 
that power sharing in Burundi is better than in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2006). Executive power in 
Burundi is shared among the different ethnic groups (see section 5.1.1). The parliament is not 
independent in Rwanda simply endorses all presidential initiatives (Freedom House, 2018). 
Although Lemarchand, sees Burundi as a promising case to have more power sharing. Which 
he defines as “power relations thorough a more inclusive participation in policy making, accompanied 
by corresponding spheres of autonomy for the groups concerned” (Lemarchand, 2006, p2). In more 
recent times, as we have seen in section 5.1.2, in both countries, the political power lies with one party 
and its leaders. In Burundi relative autonomy for the elite increased since the 2015 elections. There is a 
lack of political opposition and civil society is weak (section 5.2.2). Society is incapable in influencing 
the state’s policies.  The elites in both countries do not have to concern itself with civil society or 
opposition.. Because of the weak civil society in both countries, the governments do not have to concern 
itself with the society. The governments do not face any restrictions on their power and can do as they 
please.  
5.2.4 Powerful, Effective Bureaucracy 
In the worldwide governance, different indicators are measured that show the quality and the ability of 
the state’s bureaucracy indicators (World Bank, 2018d). Scores can vary between -0,25 and +0,25. Zero 
is the average world score. Rwanda scores high on government effectiveness. The graphs show that 
Rwanda scores higher than Burundi in the period of 1998 to 2016; indicating that Rwanda has a more 
effective government since 1996 relative to Burundi. In 2016 Rwanda scored positive for the first time 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Rwanda -1.15 -0.88 -0.65 -0.91 -0.56 -0.25 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.11
Burundi -1.66 -1.58 -1.38 -1.4 -1.31 -1.1 -1.13 -1.1 -1.32 -1.13 -1.4
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Government Effectiveness (World Bank, 2018)
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on this index, indicating that from 2016 government has been more effective compared to the average 
in rest of the world. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
Hypothesis 2 stated that Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi. I 
have tried to test this by evaluating if the characteristics of a developmental state were present in Rwanda 
or Burundi. Burundi does not seem to have a determined developmental elite. Both governments have 
shown the developmental ambition but Burundi has achieved little result. Rwanda on the other hand, is 
actively developing its economy and achieving the necessary results. Corruption in Rwanda is far less 
than in Burundi, which is to be expected when a determined developmental elite is present. Government 
effectiveness in Rwanda is significantly higher than in Burundi.   
When taken in account the characteristics of the developmental state, I can conclude that all 
characteristics of the developmental state are present in Rwanda. In Burundi, on the other hand we have 
only encountered a weak civil society and relative autonomy of the state. Therefore, I have failed to 
reject hypothesis 2. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi Leftwich’s theory of developmental state is 
supported.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction, I stated the following question: “Which theory best explains the differences in the 
developmental progress between Rwanda and Burundi?” By exploring the theoretical debate on 
development, I have tried to identify the different theories that were relevant in the case of Rwanda and 
Burundi.  This led me to making a comparison between the state-led theory on development by Leftwich 
and an institutional explanation by Acemoglu and Robinson. Leftwich describes a particular type of 
state as essential, which he calls the ‘developmental state’. Developmental states have the following 
characteristic: a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, weak civil society and a powerful 
effective bureaucracy.  Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of a state’s institutions are 
essential.  States with inclusive institutions will be able to succeed and reach sustainable developmental 
progress. While states with extractive institutions will likely fail. The origins of these institutions can be 
tracked down to the colonial era. Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize pluralism and the role of 
democracy. Based on the literature two hypothesis were constructed to test which theory is best 
supported in the case of Rwanda and Burundi.  
Hypothesis 1 : Rwanda has more political & economical inclusive institutions than Burundi.  
Hypothesis 2: Rwanda has more characteristics of the developmental state than Burundi 
Hypothesis 1 was constructed to test Acemoglu and Robinsons theory and Hypothesis 2 to test 
Leftwich’s theory. To measure if inclusive were present in Rwanda certain indicators were determined 
based on the literature. The chosen indicators were political system, electoral system, freedom of press 
and freedom of assembly and association. According to Acemoglu and Robinson we would expect 
Rwanda to have more inclusive institutions than Burundi. As expected Burundi does not seem to have 
inclusive institutions. Rwanda does not perform much better; on certain areas, it even has less inclusive 
institutions than Burundi. The representation of ethnic groups is better in Burundi while Rwanda has 
better inclusive economic institutions. On other indicators, not many differences were found. I have not 
found empirical evidence support for hypothesis 1. Acemoglu & Robinson theory has not been able to 
explain the differences in economic development. Therefore, their theory that inclusive institutions 
provide for economic growth, is not supported in our cases. 
To measure if Rwanda or Burundi qualify as developmental state, certain indicators were 
determined based on the characteristics of developmental state: a determined developmental elite, 
relative autonomy, weak civil society and a powerful effective bureaucracy. Hypothesis 2 was 
constructed to test Leftwich’s model of the developmental state. Burundi did not meet the requirements 
to be characterized as a developmental state. A determined developmental elite is absent and there is no 
powerful effective government. Rwanda on the other hand, does have the features of a developmental 
state, all characteristics are present. We have failed to reject hypothesis 2, Leftwich’s theory has been 
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able to explain the differences in developmental progress. Hence Leftwich’s theory of the developmental 
state has found support in our cases. 
To answer the question: “Which theory best explains the differences in the developmental progress 
between Rwanda and Burundi?” I have come to the conclusion that Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory 
has not been able to explain the differences in development. Leftwich on the other hand has been able 
to answer this question. In Rwanda all characteristics of the developmental state were present. In  
Burundi only two characteristics were present. 
I would suggest further research to focus on the role of democracy in democracy. Acemoglu and 
Robinson argue that without democracy developmental progress is not sustainable. In Rwanda’s, the 
progress that has booked will not be sustainable. Leftwich disagrees and claims that economic progress 
can shape the conditions for democracy to arise. In this paper, I have not been able to answer this 
question and believe it is an interesting question.  
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